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Monetary Policy and the Dutch Disease in a
Small Open Oil Exporting Economy.
Mohamed Tahar Benkhodja.y
Université Lyon 2 and GATE-LSE
Abstract
In this paper, we compare, rst, the impact of a windfall and a boom sectors on
the economy of an oil exporting country and their welfare implications; in a second
step, we analyze how monetary policy should be conducted to insulate the economy
from the main impact of these shocks, namely the Dutch Disease. To do so, we built
a Multisector DSGE model with nominal and real rigidities. The main nding is
that Dutch disease e¤ect arise after spending and resource movement e¤ects in the
following cases: i) exible prices and wages both in the case of a windfall and in the
case of a boom; ii) exible wage and sticky price only in the case of a xed exchange
rate. In other cases, Dutch disease e¤ect can be avoided if: prices are sticky and
wages are exible when the exchange rate is exible; iii) prices and wages are sticky
whatever the objective of the central bank is in both cases: windfall and boom. We
also compare the source of uctuation that leads to Dutch disease e¤ect and we
conclude that the windfall leads to a strong e¤ect in terms of de-industrialization
compared to a boom. The choice of exible exchange rate regime also helps to
improve welfare.
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1 Introduction
The Dutch Disease theory was developed after the Netherlands found large sources
of natural gas in the North Sea in the 1960s. Large capital inows, from increased
export revenues caused, demand for the Dutch orin to rise, which, in turn, led to an
appreciation of the Dutch exchange rate. This appreciation made it di¢ cult for the
manufacturing sector to compete in international markets.
This theory has been the subject of abundant theoretical literature since the begin-
ning of the 80s. It has been developed in a partial equilibrium framework and can be
presented in two forms: the spending e¤ect and the resource movement e¤ect. Both
e¤ects lead to a decline of the manufacturing sector. This decline occurs because of the
fall of output in this sector. Indeed, if the oil supply is inelastic, a rise of oil price leads
to an increase of the demand of labor and capital in the oil sector and increases wages
and capital return in this sector. If the production factors are mobile, capital and labor
will move from the manufacturing sector to the oil and services sectors which will cause
de-industrialization.
In their original work, Corden and Neary (1982) present the spending e¤ect as the
consequence of exchange rate appreciation on manufacturing sector production. Accord-
ing to these authors, the appreciation is due to an increase in the relative price stemming
from increased demand in the service sector. Indeed, when manufacturing output falls,
its price does not change because it is determined on the international market and the
economy is considered as small. Demand for services will, therefore, increase along with
its price. This leads to a rise in the price of non-tradables relative to tradables and to a
real appreciation.
Regarding the resource movement e¤ect, Corden and Neary (1982) explain that it is
a consequence of perfect mobility of capital and labor from the manufacturing sector to
the oil and services sectors. The resource movement e¤ect occurs because an increase
in oil prices generates a rise in wages and/or prots and generates a rise in aggregate
demand in the economy. To the extent that a part of this demand will move toward the
service sector, the price of non-tradable goods will rise. Consequently, the real exchange
rate appreciates and generates a de-industrialization for the reasons explained above.
Two types of external shocks generate these e¤ects: windfall and boom. Although
they are both positive external shocks, a windfall shock (a rise of price of natural re-
source) does not incur costs while a boom shock (an increase in the stock of oil resources)
does incur costs1.
1The search for new resource and its extraction requires costs while the rise of price of oil not.
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Recent studies like Sosunov and Zamulin (2007), Lartey (2008), Batt et al (2008),
Acosta et al (2009) and Lama and Medina (2010) have used DSGE models to assess the
impact of a positive external shock in the case of a small open economy2. These articles
discuss the impact of a positive external shock as an increase of capital inow (Lartey
(2008)), remittances (Acosta et al (2009)) or of commodity prices (Sosunov and Zamlin
(2007), Batt et al (2008) and Lama and Medina (2010)). These shocks are dened in the
literature of the Dutch disease as windfall shocks. A boom shock which requires costs
has not been studied. Indeed, none of these papers is directly concerned with the e¤ect
of boom shocks and even less by a comparison between both sources of Dutch disease.
In addition, none of them assesses the role of monetary policy in each case. Finally, none
of these models directly analyze oil-exporting economies, which are the most vulnerable
to this type of shocks.
In this context, we build a small open oil-exporting economy model with four sectors
while the above-mentioned contributions build DSGE models with only tradable and
non-tradable sectors. In this paper we add an oil sector to better reect the mechanisms
of the Dutch disease described in the literature by Corden and Neary (1982). The latter
assume that the economy is composed of three sectors: i) the booming sector: after the
discovery of a new resource or a technological progress in the commodity sector or a rise
of natural resource price; ii) the lagging sector: generally refers to the manufacturing
sector but can also refer to agriculture; iii) the non-tradable sector: includes services,
utilities, transportation, etc.
To investigate the impact of the two main sources of Dutch Disease namely the wind-
fall sector (an increase in oil prices) and the boom sector (an increase of oil resource)
in a general equilibrium framework, we develop a Multisecor Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral equilibrium (MDSGE) model with microeconomic foundations and price and wage
rigidities. The model is based on recent studies that have developed models for small
open economies (Dib (2008), Bouakez, Rebei and Vencatachellum (2008), Acosta, Lartey
and Mandelman (2009) and Lama and Medina (2010)). Drawing on these papers, we
assume that the economy is inhabited by households, oil producing rms, non-tradable
and tradable good producers, intermediate foreign goods importers, a central bank and
a government. We also assume, as in Bouakez et al (2008), that the domestic oil price
is given by a convex combination of the current world price expressed in local currency
and the last periods domestic price. We adopt, nally, a Taylor-type monetary policy
rule where it is assumed that the monetary authority adjusts the short-term nominal
2Table 5 summarizes these papers focusing on the structure of models as well as the main assumptions
and results.
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interest rate in response to uctuations in CPI ination and exchange rate.
The main nding is that the Dutch disease under both spending and resource move-
ment e¤ects are realized in the following cases: i) exible prices and wages both in the
case of a windfall and in the case of a boom; ii) exible wages and sticky prices only in
the case of a xed exchange rate. In other cases, the simulations indicate that Dutch
disease e¤ects do not arise when prices are sticky, wages and the exchange rate are ex-
ible; iii) prices and wages are sticky whatever the objective of the central bank is. We
also compare the source of uctuations that leads to a Dutch disease and we conclude
that the windfall leads to a stronger de-industrialization compared to a boom.
In this paper, it appears that the exible exchange rate seems to be the best way to
avoid the Dutch disease both in the cases of a windfall and a boom, but also to improve
a social welfare. In other words, it is preferable for a central bank, in an oil exporting
economy, to adopt ination targeting regime to prevent the impact of oil shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the details
of the model. Section 3 discusses the parameters calibration. Section 4 presents the
results. Section 5 measures the welfare e¤ect of both windfall and boom under alternative
monetary policy rules. Section 6 concludes.
2 Small Open Oil Exporting Economy Model
In this section, we model an oil exporting economy based on recent small open economy
models (Dib (2008), Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman (2009) and Lama and Medina
(2010)). We assume that the economy is inhabited by eight agents: households, oil
producing rm, non-tradable and tradable goods producers, an intermediate foreign
goods importer, a nal good producer, a central bank and a government.
Households have access to international nancial markets where they can buy or
sell foreign non-state contingent bonds. They can also revise their nominal wages à la
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). In both oil, tradable and nal goods sectors, each producer
operates under perfect competition, while in the non-tradable goods and imports sectors,
there is a continuum of monopolistically-competitive rms. These rms set their prices
à la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). The central bank follows a Taylor-type rule, aimed
at stabilizing the CPI ination rate and changes in the nominal exchange rate.
4
5Figure A : Flow chart for the economy
Government Central Bank Foreign economy
Capital and Wage
Inflation Exchange rate
Oil’s revenue targeting targeting
Export
Oil Sector
Domestic output Fraction of output Capital return, wage and profit
Final good producer Tradable Sector Households
Labor supply
All production Non-Tradable Sector
Differentiated good Import Sector Homogenous intermediate goods
Non-contingent bonds
International financial Market
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by  2 (0; 1). Each household supplies
di¤erenciated labor services to the three production sectors, namely oil, tradable and
non-tradable sectors. As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), a representative labor
aggregator (or "employment agency") combines householdshours in the same propor-
tions as rms would choose optimally. Thus, in each sector j, the demand curve for each
type of labor is:
hj;t() =

Wj;t ()
Wj;t
 
hj;t: (1)
variables ho;t; hT;t and hnT;t denote aggregate labor supplies to oil, tradable and
non-tradable sectors, respectively.  > 1 denotes the constant elasticity of substitution
between di¤erent types of labor services, Wj;t() is the wage rate set by the household 
and Wo;t;WT;t and WnT;t are the aggregate wage index, or the unit cost of sales to the
oil, tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively.
The aggregate wage index Wj;t in sector j is given by:
Wj;t=
0@ 1Z
0
Wj;t ()
1  d
1A
1
1 
(2)
;from (1) and (2), we consider Wj;t and hj;t as given.
Each household derives utility from consumption ct () and disutility from labor
ht () :
U0() = E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct () ; ht ()) ; (3)
where  is the subjective discount factor (0 <  < 1) :The intantaneous utility function,
u(:), is:
u(:) =
1
1   ct ()
1   ht ()
1+
1 + 
; (4)
where the preference parameters are  > 1 and  > 0. The rst parameter, , is the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption and the second
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parameter, , denotes the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply. Aggregate labor
supply, ht () ;depends on sector-specic labor supplies according to:
ht ()= ho;t ()
ho hT;t ()
hT hnT;t ()
hnT ; (5)
where ho;t () ; hT;t () and hnT;t () represent hours worked by the household  at time
t in oil, tradable and non-tradable sectors, respectively. The parameters ho; hT and
hnT denote the elasticity of substitution of labor in the three sectors, where ho+
hT + hnT = 1:
Households have access to domestic and international nancial markets. Each house-
hold enters period t with holdings of domestic bonds denominated in units of domestic
currency, Bdt 1 (), and foreign bonds denominated in units of foreign currency, B
f
t 1 ().
These bonds are not state contingent. This assumption is crucial. In oil exporting
economies, households consumption is not smooth and there is no international risk
sharing. Also, since the dynamics of exchange rate and the current account play a cen-
tral role in explaning the spending e¤ect, the assumption of incomplete international
nancial markets is necessary.34
During period t, household  pays a lump-sum tax,  t (), to nance government
spendings, and sells or buys Bft () for the price that depends on a country-specic
risk-premium and the world interest rate. Buying foreign bonds entails paying a risk
premium, t, of which the functional form is borrowed from Dib (2008):
t=exp
0@ etfBft =P ft
PtYt
1A ; (6)
where  measures the risk premium, et denotes the nominal exchange rate dened as the
price of the foreign currency expressed in the domestic currency, fBft is the average stock
of external nominal debt, which is positive if the domestic economy is a net borrower or
negative if the domestic economy is a net lender. Finally, Yt is the total real GDP and
P ft is the foreign price index. This functional form ensures stationarity of the model.
5
Household  in period t earns nominal wages, Wo;t () ;WT;t () and WnT;t () for its
labor supply, respectively to the oil, tradable and non-tradable good producers. It also
3 In fact, one important implication of the incomplete markets framework is that it allows us to
characterize the dynamics of the current account. See, among others, Chari, Kehoe and MacGrattan
(2002), Benigno (2004) and Begnino and Theonissen (2006).
4See Kollmann (1996), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005) for more
details about the implications of complete and incomplete international nancial markets.
5See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) for alternative ways of ensuring stationary paths in a small
open economy.
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receives dividend payments from both non-tradable, DnT;t (), and import, DI;t (), sec-
tors so thatDt () =DnT;t ()+DI;t () and a factor payment of oil resources, $ ()PO;tOt,
where PO;t is the nominal price of oil resource input Ot and$ () is the share of household
 in oil resource payments with
1Z
0
$ () d = 1:
Finally, household  accumulates ko;t () ; kT;t () and knT;t () units of capital stocks,
used in the oil, tradable and non-tradable sectors and receives nominal rentals Qo;t; QT;t
and QnT;t respectively. The evolution of capital stock in each sector is given by:
kj;t+1 () = (1  )kj;t () + ij;t () 	j (kj;t+1 () ; kj;t ()) ; (7)
where  is depreciation rate, common to all sectors (0 <  < 1) and 	j;t(kj;t+1 (), kj;t ())
is an adjustment cost paid by households and satises  j (0) = 0;  
0
j (:) > 0 and  
00
j (:) <
0: The functional form of 	j (:) is taken from Ireland (2003):
	j;t (:) =
 j
2

kj;t+1 ()
kj;t ()
  1
2
kj;t () : (8)
The presence of the capital adjustment cost implies that, out of the steady state, the
price of newly installed capital di¤ers from the price of investment goods, i.e. Tobins Q
di¤ers from 1. This form also allows to have both total and marginal costs of adjusting
capital equal to zero in the steady state.
The expenditures and revenues presented above give us the following households
budget constraint:
Pt (ct () + it ()) +
Bdt ()
Rt
+
etB
f
t ()
Rft t
 Bdt 1 () + etBft 1 ()+X
j=o;T;nT
Qj;tkj;t ()+
X
j=o;T;nT
Wj;thj;t () + $ ()PO;tOt +Dt ()   t () ; (9)
where it () = io;t () + iT;t () + inT;t () denotes total investment. Pt is the consumption
price index (CPI), dened below.
2.1.1 Consumption decision
Given initial values, household  chooses {ct (), ko;t+1 (), kT;t+1 (), knT;t+1 (), Bdt ()
and Bft ()} to maximize equation (4) subject to equations (7) ; (8) and (9) and the
no-Ponzi game restriction.
First-order conditions of the household problem are:
7
t ()= c
 
t () ; (10)
t ()=
Et

t+1 ()

 j

kj;t+2()
kj;t+1()
  1

kj;t+2()
kj;t+1()
   j2

kj;t+2()
kj;t+1()
  1
2
+ qj;t+1 + 1  

 j

kj;t+1()
kj;t()
  1

+ 1
;
(11)
for j=(o; T; nT )
t ()= Et

t+1 ()
t+1

Rt; (12)
t () st
Rft t
= Et
 
t+1 () st+1
ft+1
!
; (13)
where qj;t =
Qj;t
Pt
; t+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
; ft+1 =
P ft+1
P ft
and st =
etP
f
t
Pt
represent the real capital return
in each sector, the CPI ination rate, the foreign ination rate and the real exchange
rate, respectively. In addition, t () denotes the budget multiplier associated with the
budget constraint.
By combining equations (12) and (13) we obtain equation (14) which represents a
modied uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition:
Rt
Rft t
=
et+1
et
: (14)
2.1.2 Wage Setting:
Following Erceg et al. (2000) and Dib (2008), we suppose that wages are sticky à la
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). In each period, the constant probability of changing the
nominal wages is given by (1 'j). Therefore, on average, the wage remains unchanged
for 11 'j periods. However, if household  is not allowed to adjust its wage, it updates it
according to the following rule:
Wj;t = Wj;t 1;
where  > 1 is the long run average gross rate ination.
For the production sectors j = o; T; nT , household  chooses Wj;t () to maximize:
8
maxfWj;t()Et
" 1X
s=0
 
'j
s
(U (ct+s () ; ht+s ()) + t+s
sWj;t+s ()hj;t+s () =Pt+s)
#
; (15)
subject to:
hj;t+s () =

sWj;t ()
Wj;t+s
 
hj;t+s: (16)
The rst-order condition gives:
ewj;t () = 
   1
Et
P1
s=0
 
'j
s
t+shj;t+sj;t+sw

j;t+s
sY
k=1
 st+k
Et
P1
s=0
 
'j
s
t+shj;t+swj;t+s
sY
k=1
s(1 ) 1t+k
: (17)
Where ewj;t () = fWj;t()Pt and wj;t+s = Wj;t+sPt+s denote the real optimized wage and the real
wage in sector j respectively, and for each sector j, j;t = j;t
h1+t
hj;tt
:
The aggregate real wage index in sector j evolves according to:
(wj;t)
1  = 'j


wj;t 1
t
1 
+
 
1  'j

( ewj;t)1  (18)
where  is the long run average gross rate of ination.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), equation (17) is rewritten recursively.
The real optimized wage, ewj;t; in the sector j, is:
ewj;t = 
   1
x1j;t
x2j;t
; (19)
where x1j;t and x
2
j;t are two auxiliary variables:
x1j;t = thj;tj;tw

j;t + 'jEt
t+1


x1j;t+1

: (20)
and
x2j;t = thj;tw

j;t + 'jEt
t+1

 1
x2j;t+1

: (21)
9
Finally, Rft and 
f
t denoting respectively the foreign interest rate and the world
ination rate, evolve exogenously according to the following AR(1) process:
log(Rft ) = (1  Rf ) log(Rf ) + Rf log(Rft 1) + "Rf ;t (22)
log(ft ) = (1  f ) log(f ) + f log(ft 1) + "f ;t (23)
where removing the time index denotes steady state values and "Rf ;t and "f ;t are un-
correlated and normally distributed innovations with zero mean and standard deviations
Rf and f respectively:
2.2 Sectors
In this section, we model di¤erent sectors, as in Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden
(1984). The economy is divided into four sectors: oil, tradable, non-tradable goods and
import sectors. Modelling these sectors and assuming the factor mobility between them,
is essential to analyze the Dutch disease e¤ect.
2.2.1 Oil sector
A single oil rm operates in a perfect competition market and combines capital, ko;t =R 1
0 ko;t () d, labor, ho;t =
R 1
0 ho;t () d, and oil resource, Ot, to produce crude oil. Oil
output is totally exported abroad for the international price P fo;t denominated in the
foreign currency.
The rm maximizes prots and solves the following problem:
max
ko;t;ho;t;Ot
h
etP
f
o;tYo;t  Qo;tko;t  Wo;tho;t   PO;tOt
i
; (24)
where etP
f
o;tYo;t denotes total sale revenues in terms of domestic currency, subject to the
following production function:
Yo;t  koo;thoo;tOot ; (25)
where o; o and o 2 (0; 1) and o + o + o = 1:
Thus, given et; P
f
o;t; Po;t; Qo;t;Wo;t and PO;t; the oil producing rm chooses {ko;t; ho;t; Ot}
to maximize (24) subject to (25).
First-order conditions are:
qo;t = ostp
f
o;t
Yo;t
ko;t
; (26)
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wo;t = ostp
f
o;t
Yo;t
ho;t
; (27)
pO;t = ostp
f
o;t
Yo;t
Ot
; (28)
where qo;t =
Qo;t
Pt
; wo;t =
Wo;t
Pt
; po;t =
Po;t
Pt
; pfo;t =
P fo;t
P ft
and pO;t =
PO;t
Pt
denote respectively
the real capital return, the real wage, the real domestic oil price, the real international oil
price and the real price of the oil resource. Equations (26)  (28) represent the demand
for ko;t; ho;t and Ot respectively.
Note that foreign oils price, P fo;t, and oil resource, Ot, evolutions are given by the
following stochastic processes:
log(P fo;t) = (1  P fo ) log(P
f
o ) + P fo
log(P fo;t 1) + "P fo ;t; (29)
log(Ot) = (1  O) log(O) + O log(Ot 1) + "O;t; (30)
where P fo and O are steady state values of P
f
o;t and Ot, P fo and O are the autocorrelation
coe¢ cients, and "
P fo ;t
and "O;t are uncorrelated and normally distributed innovations
with zero mean and standard deviations 
P fo
and O respectively:
2.2.2 Tradable sector
In this sector, the tradable good is a manufatured good. Again, tradable good producer
operates on perfect competition markets. The rm produces its tradables using capital,
kT;t =
R 1
0 kT;t () d, labor, hT;t =
R 1
0 hT;t () d, and rened oil input
6, Y ITo;t . Their
production function is given by:
YT;t  kTT;thTT;tY
I
T
T
o;t ; (31)
where T ; T and T 2 (0; 1) and T + T + T = 1:
Thus, given et; PT;t; Po;t; QT;t;andWT;t; the tradable rm chooses {kT;t,hT;t and Y
IT
o;t}
to solve its maximization problem. The rst order conditions are:
qT;t = T stpT;t
YT;t
kT;t
; (32)
6See section 5 for more details about rened oil.
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wT;t = T stpT;t
YT;t
hT;t
; (33)
po;t = T stpT;t
YT;t
Y ITo;t
; (34)
where qT;t =
QT;t
Pt
; wT;t =
WT;t
Pt
; pT;t =
PT;t
P ft
; st = et
P ft
Pt
and po;t =
Po;t
Pt
denote respectively
the real capital return, the real wage, the real tradable price, the real exchange rate and
the real domestic oil.
The price of tradable good pT;t, is given by (32)  (34) and (31) :
stpT;t =
qTT;tw
T
T;tp
T
o;t
TT 
T
T 
T
T
: (35)
2.2.3 Non-tradable sector
In this sector, non-tradable good producers operate under monopolistic competition.
There is a continuum of rms indexed by i 2 (0; 1) : Each rm i produces non-tradable
good using the following production function:
YnT;t (i)  knTnT;t (i)hnTnT;t (i)Y InT
nT
o;t (i) ; (36)
where knT;t (i) ; hnT;t (i) and Y
InT
o;t (i) are used by rms to produce the non-tradable
goods. Note also that nT ; nT and nT 2 (0; 1) and nT + nT + nT = 1:
To maximize its prot, the producer i chooses
n
KnT;t (i) ; hnT;t (i) and Y
InT
o;t (i)
o
and
sets its price, ePnT;t (i) à la Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Following a stochastic time
dependent Calvo (1983) rule, the producer faces, in each period, a constant probability
of changing its price. This probability is given by (1  nT ) : Therefore, on average, the
price remains unchanged for 11 nT periods. However, if non-tradable rm is not allowed
to adjust its price, it updates it according to the following rule:
PnT;t = PnT;t 1;
The non-tradable rmsmaximization problem can be written as follow:
max
knT;t(i);hnT;t(i);PnT;t(i)
E0
1X
s=0
[(nT )
s t+sDnT;t+s(i)=Pt+s]; (37)
subject to (36) and the following demand function:
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YnT;t+s (i) =
 
s ePnT;t (i)
PnT;t+s
! #
YnT;t+s; (38)
with DnT;t+s(i) the prot function:
DnT;t+s(i) = 
s ePnT;t (i)YnT;t+s (i) QnT;t+sknT;t+s (i) WnT;t+shnT;t+s (i) Po;tY InTo;t (i) ;
where st+s is the producers discount factor and t+s the marginal utility of con-
sumption in period t+ s:
The rst-order conditions of the maximization problem are:
qnT;t = nT
YnT;t (i)
knT;t (i)
mcnT;t; (39)
wnT;t = nT
YnT;t (i)
hnT;t (i)
mcnT;t; (40)
po;t = nT
YnT;t (i)
Y InTo;t (i)
mcnT;t; (41)
where qnT;t =
QnT;t
Pt
; wnT;t =
WnT;t
Pt
;mcnT;t =
MCnT;t
Pt
and po;t =
Po;t
Pt
denote respectively
the real capital return, the real wage, the real marginal cost and the real domestic oil
price. We obtain the real marginal cost, mcnT;t, by replacing (39)  (41) in (36) :
mcnT;t =
qnTnT;tw
nT
nT;tp
nT
o;t
nTnT 
nT
nT 
nT
nT
: (42)
The optimal pricing condition is given by the maximization of (37):
epnT;t (i) = #
#  1
E0
1X
s=0
(nT )
s t+sYnT;t+sp
#
nT;t+smcnT;t+s
sY
k=1
 s##t+k
E0
1X
s=0
(nT )
s t+sYnT;t+sp#nT;t+s
sY
k=1
s(1 #)# 1t+k
; (43)
where pnT;t+s =
PnT;t+s
Pt+s
;mcnT;t+s =
MCnT;t+s
Pt+s
; epnT;t (i) = ePnT;t(i)pt and t+s = Pt+sPt denote
respectively the relative price of non-tradable good, the real marginal cost in the non-
tradable sector, the real optimized price for non-tradable good and the CPI ination
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rate.
We rewrite the optimal pricing condition as follows:
epnT;t = #
#  1
V 1nT;t
V 2nT;t
; (44)
where V 1nT;t and V
2
nT;t are two auxiliary variables:
V 1nT;t = tYnT;tmcnT;tp

nT;t + nTEt
t+1

#
V 1nT;t+1

; (45)
and,
V 2nT;t = tYnT;tp

nT;t + nTEt
t+1

# 1
V 2nT;t+1

: (46)
Note nally that the aggregate real non-tradable price index evolves according to:
(pnT;t)
1 # = nT


pnT;t 1
t
1 #
+ (1  nT ) (epnT;t)1 # : (47)
2.2.4 Import sector
The nal good producer uses an imported-composite good, YI;t, purchased in a domestic
monopolistically competitive market. To produce YI;t, the rm uses di¤erentiated goods,
YI;t (i) ; that are produced by a continuum of domestic importers, indexed by i 2 (0; 1),
using a homogeneous intermediate good produced abroad for the world price P ft : The
di¤erentiated goods are sold at price PI;t (i) subject to Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996)
contracts.7 Therefore, the importer faces, in each period, a constant probability (1  I)
of changing its price as in Calvo (1983). Following Yun (1996), we assume that if
importers are not able to change their price, they index them to the steady state CPI
ination rate.
The maximization problem of importers can be written as follows:
maxePI;t(i)E0
1X
s=0
(I)
s t+s

s ePI;t (i)  et+sP ft+sYI;t+s (i) ; (48)
where YI;t+s (i) is chosen by rms to maximize their prot:
7 Introducing price rigidities allows the deviation from the law of one price in the import sector, leading
to incomplete pass-through e¤ects of exchange rate movements.
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YI;t+s (i) =
 
s ePI;t (i)
PI;t+s
! #
YI;t+s: (49)
The zero prot condition gives the importer price index:
PI;t+s =
Z 1
0
s ePI;t (i)1 # di 11 # : (50)
Replacing (49) in (48), we get the optimal pricing condition:
epI;t (i)= #
#  1
E0
1X
s=0
(I)
s
t+sYI;t+sp
#
I;t+smcI;t+s
sY
k=1
 s##t+k
E0
1X
s=0
(I)
s
t+sYI;t+sp#I;t+s
sY
k=1
s(1 #)# 1t+k
, (51)
where pI;t+s =
PI;t+s
Pt+s
is the relative price of imports;mcI;t+s =
etP
f
t+s
Pt+s
= st is the real
marginal cost which is equal to the real exchange rate; epI;t (i) = ePI;t(i)pt is the optimized
price in import sector and t+s =
Pt+s
Pt
is the CPI ination rate.
The aggregate real import price index evolves according to:
(pI;t)
1 # = I


pI;t 1
t
1 #
+ (1  I) (epI;t)1 # ; (52)
The non-linear recursive form of Eq(51) can be written as follow:
epI;t = #
#  1
V 1I;t
V 2I;t
; (53)
where V 1I;t and V
2
I;t are two auxiliary variables that take the following form:
V 1I;t = tYI;tmcI;tp

I;t + IEt
t+1

#
V 1I;t+1

; (54)
V 2I;t = tYI;tp

I;t + IEt
t+1

# 1
V 2I;t+1

: (55)
2.3 Final good producer
We assume that the producer of the nal good operates under perfect competition. It
uses the following CES technology that includes a fraction of tradable output, Y dT;t, which
is domestically-used, the non-tradable output, YnT;t, and imports, YI;t:
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zt =


1

T Y
d
 1

T + 
1

nTY
 1

nT + 
1

I Y
 1

I
 
 1
; (56)
where  > 0 denotes the elasticity of substitution between the fraction of tradable
output, the non-tradable output and imported goods and T ; nT ; I represent the
shares of tradable, non-tradable and imported goods in the total expenditure of nal
good, where T +nT +I = 1: To maximize its prot, the nal good producer choosesn
YI;t; Y
d
T;t and YnT;t
o
:
The maximization problem is:
max
YI;t;Y
d
T;t;YnT;t
Ptzt   PI;tYI;t   PT;tY dT;t   PnT;tYnT;t;
subject to (56). Solving this problem, we get the following demand functions:
YI;t = I

PI;t
Pt
 
zt; Y
d
T;t = T

PT;t
Pt
 
zt; YnT;t = nT

PnT;t
Pt
 
zt: (57)
where Pt; PI;t; PT;t; PnT;t are given. Note also that the zero prot condition implies that
the price of the nal good is given by:
Pt =
h
IP
1 
I;t + TP
1 
T;t + nTP
1 
nT;t
i 1
1 
; (58)
Finally, the nal good is split between total consumption and total investment so
that zt = ct + io;t + iT;t + inT;t:
2.4 Central Bank
It is assumed that the central bank adjusts the short-term nominal interest rate, Rt,
in response to uctuation in CPI ination, t, and exchange rate changes et: As in
Bouakez et al (2008), we use the following Taylor-type policy rule to close the model:
log

Rt
R

=  log
t


+ e log

et
e

: (59)
where ;e; and R are the steady-state values of ination (t) ;exchange rate (et)
and nominal interest rate (Rt) respectively. The policy coe¢ cients,  and e, measure
the central bank responses to deviation of (t) and (et) from their steady state levels.
When e = 0 and  = 1, the central bank responds only to ination movements
(and the exchange rate regime is oating). When  = 0 and e = 1 the central bank
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manages its rate to respond only to exchange rate uctuation (and the exchange rate
regime is xed).
2.5 Government
In an oil exporting economy8, the oil domestically used (rened oil), Y Io;t, is mostly
produced abroad. For this, we assume that the government, which is the owner of the oil
rm, buys it from the world market for the international price, P fo;t, denominated in the
foreign currency. The rened oil is sold domestically to the tradable and non-tradable
rms at price Po;t which can be considered as the domestic fuel prices. The latter is
supposed to be subsidized by the government. For this purpose, we follow Bouakez et
al. (2008) and assume that the domestic oil price Po;t is a convex combination of the
current world price expressed in local currency and previous period domestic price. It is
given by:
po;t = (1  )(po;t 1=t) + stpfo;t; (60)
where  2 (0; 1) ; and pfo;t denotes the real world oil price, determined in the world
market and denominated in units of foreign currency.
Thus, when  = 1; there is no subsidy and the pass-through from the world oil price
is complete. However, when  = 0; the domestic oil price is fully subsidized and there is
no pass-through. Thus, all domestic rms will buy oil at price po;t:
Following this, the governments budget constraint can be written as follow:
po;tY
I
o;t + stp
f
o;tYo;t +  t = stp
f
o;tY
I
o;t + wo;tho;t + qo;tko;t + PO;tOt; (61)
where the left-hand side represents the governments revenues that include lump-sum
taxes,  t, and receipts from selling oil to domestic, po;tY Io;t; and foreign, stp
f
o;tY
ex
o;t , rms.
The right-hand side represents the government spending and include payments of both
wages and capital returns (wo;tho;t + qo;tko;t) in the oil sector and the amount of imported
rened oil, stp
f
o;tY
I
o;t.
2.6 Aggregation and Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all households, importers and non-tradable good produc-
ers make the same decision so that: ct () = ct; ht () = ht; ho;t () = ho;t; hT;t () =
hT;t; hnT;t () = hnT;t; bt () = bt; b
f
t () = b
f
t ; ko;t () = ko;t; kT;t () = kT;t; knT;t () =
knT;t; wo;t () = wo;t; wT;t () = wT;t; wnT;t () = wnT;t; DnT;t () = DnT;t; DI;t () =
8 Its the case of Algeria and other countries as Iran for example.
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DI;t; i () = i; YnT;t (i) = YnT;t; Y
InT
o;t (i) = Y
InT
o;t ; epnT;t (i) = epnT;t, YI;t (i) = YI;t; epI;t (i) =epI;t for all  and i 2 (0; 1) ; where bt = BtPt ; bft = BftP ft are the real net domestic and foreign
currency bonds respectively. Thus, a symmetric equilibrium for this economy is com-
posed of an allocation {ct, it, io;t, iT;t, inT;t, Yo;t, YnT;t, YT;t, YIo;t, Y
IT
o;t, Y
InT
o;t , Y
d
T , Y
ex
T ,
YI;t, Yt, YvanT;t, Y
va
T;t, zt, ko;t, kT;t, knT;t, ht, ho;t, hT;t, hnT;t, b
f
t , t, o;t, T;t, nT;t}
1
t=0
and a sequence of prices and co-state variables {wo;t, wT;t, wnT;t, ewo;t; ewT;t; ewnT;t;qo;t, qT;t,
qnT;t, po;t, pT;t, pnT;t, epnT;t, pI;t, epI;t, pO;t, t, nT;t, I;t, st, et, Rt, t, mcnT;t, mcI;t}1t=0
satisfying households, oil, tradable and non-tradable rst-order conditions, the aggre-
gate resources constraints, the monetary policy rules, the current account equation and
the stochastic processes {pfo;t,Ot,R
f
t ,Y
f
T ,
f
t }
1
t=0 of the shocks and the following market
clearing conditions bt = bt 1 = 0, b
f
t =
ebft and:
Y Io;t = Y
IT
o;t + Y
InT
o;t (62)
YT;t = Y
d
T;t + Y
ex
T;t (63)
Finally, the home economy exports part of its tradable output. According to Mc-
Callum and Nelson (1999)9 and Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2003), we assume that
the foreign demand for the tradable goods, Y exT;t, is given by :
Y exT;t = T
 
etPT;t
P ft
! !T
Y fT;t: (64)
where the foreign production of tradable goods, Y fT;t;is exogenous and evolves ac-
cording to the following stochastic processes:
log(Y fT;t) = (1  Y fT ) log(Y
f
T ) + Y fT
log(Y fT;t 1) + "Y fT ;t
(65)
where Y fT > 0 is the steady-state values of Y
f
T;t and Y fT
the autoregressive coe¢ cients
and "
Y fT ;t
the uncorrelated and normally distributed innovations with zero mean and
standard deviation 
Y fT
:
The aggregate GDP is dened as:
Yt = pT;tY
va
T;t + pnT;tY
va
nT;t + stp
f
o;tYo;t; (66)
9As in McCallum and Nelson (1999), we assume that the domestic economys exports from an in-
signicant franction of foreignersconsumption, and thus their weight in the foreign economys aggregate
price index is negligible.
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where Y vaT;t, and Y
va
nT;t are the value-added output in tradable and non-tradable sectors
respectively. These variables are constructed by subtracting oil input as follows:10
Y vaT;t = YT;t   po;t
Y ITo;t
pT;t
; (67)
Y vanT;t = YnT;t   po;t
Y InTo;t
pnT;t
: (68)
Combining the householdsbudget constraint, the single period prot functions of
non-tradable good producing rms and foreign good importers, the rst-order conditions
of the four sectors, and applying the market clearing conditions, we get the following
current account equation:
bft
tR
f
t
=
bft 1
ft
+ pT;tY
ex
T;t + p
f
o;tYo;t   pfo;tY Io;t   YI;t: (69)
3 Calibration
We assign values to the structural parameters of the model, taken from the literature of
DSGE models, and adapt them to characterize an oil exporting economy.11 We also set
the coe¢ cients of correlation and standard deviation of the stochastic processes using
OLS estimation.
There are 36 structural parameters in the model {, , , ho , hT , hnT ,  o,  T ,
 nT , , , , , o, o, o, T , T , T , nT , nT , nT , #, nT , I , 'o, 'T , 'nT , T ,
nT , I ,  , T , !T , , e}. The subjective discount factor, , is set at 0:99 which
implies an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4%. As in Bouakez et al (2008), Dib
(2008) and Lartey (2008) the inverse of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution
of consumption  is set at 2. Following Devereux et al (2006) among others, the inverse
of the elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of labor  is set at 1. The capital
depreciation rate  is set at 0:025: This value is common to the three sectors of production
(oil, tradable and non-tradable sectors).
The parameters (o; o; o) ,(T ; T ; T ), and (nT ; nT ; nT ), which are associated
with the shares of capital, labor and a fraction of oil output in the output of each sector,
are calibrated as in Macklem et al. (2000). We set the share of capital, o; labor, o,
10As in Dib (2008), our model suppose that tradable and non-tradable rms use rened oil as material
inputs in their productions which is dened as gross output. Thus, value added output in each sector
can be constructed by substracting commodity inputs.
11We calibrate the model to match some features of oil exporting economies. Of these, Canadian and
Algerian economies will be used to calibrate some parameters.
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Table 1: Calibration of structural parameters
Description Parameters Values
Structural Parameters
Subject discount factor  0:99
Labor elasticity of substitution # 8
Intermediate good elasticity of substitution  6
The inverse of the elasticity of intertemp substi of cons  2
The inverse of the Frish wage elasticity of labour supply  1
Labor elasticity of substitution in the oil sector ho 0:32
Labor elasticity of substitution in the tradable sector hT 0:13
Labor elasticity of substitution in the non-tradable sector hnT 0:55
Parameter measuring the risk premium  0:0015
The depreciation rate of capital  0:025
Share of capital in the production of oil o 0:31
Share of labor in the production of oil o 0:24
Share of oil resource in the production of oil o 0:45
Share of capital in the production of tradable goods T 0:33
Share of labor in the production of tradable goods T 0:57
Share of oil input in the production of tradable goods T 0:1
Share of capital in the production of non-tradable goods nT 0:23
Share of labor in the production of non-tradable goods nT 0:52
Share of oil input in the production of non-tradable goods nT 0:25
Oil price rule parameter  0:3
Calvo wage parameter for the oil sector 'o 0:65
Calvo wage parameter for the tradable sector 'T 0:65
Calvo wage parameter for the non-tradable sector 'nT 0:65
Capital adjustment cost parameter in oil sector  o 3
Capital adjustment cost parameter in tradable sector  T 3
Capital adjustment cost parameter in non-tradable sector  nT 3
Calvo price parameter in the non-tradable sector nT 0:65
Calvo price parameter in the import sector I 0:65
Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods  0:8
Share of imported goods in the nal good I 0:45
Share of tradable goods in the nal good T 0:2
Share of non-tradable goods in the nal good nT 0:35
Constant associated with the share of exports in home GDP T 0:2
Elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods !T 0:8
Ination coe¢ cient in the monetary policy rule  0;1
Exchange rate coe¢ cient in the monetary policy rule e 1; 0
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and oil resources, o, in the production of oil to 0:41, 0:39 and 0:2 respectively. In the
sector of tradable goods, the share of capital, T , labor, T , and a fraction of oil output,
T , are assigned values to 0:26, 0:63 and 0:11 respectively. We also set to 0:28, 0:66
and 0:06 the share of capital, nT , labor, nT , and a fraction of oil output, nT ; in the
production of non-tradable goods.
As in Dib (2008), we set the parameters that represent the degree of monopoly power
in the intermediate good market, , and the labor market, #, equal to 6 and 8 respectively.
The steady-state price and wage markup are equal to 20% and 14% respectively. The
price elasticity of demand for imported, domestic tradable and non-tradable goods,  ,
is set at 0:8 as in Dib (2008). The share of imports, ; I , domestic tradable, ; T , and
non-tradable goods, nT , in the production of nal goods are set equal to 0:45, 0:2 and
0:35 respectively. These values are chosen given that the value of the average ratio of
both imports and tradable good production12 to GDP of Algerian economy. The share
of non-tradable good is chosen by subtracting to the unit the previous values. We set
values of the labor elasticity of substitution to match the shares of wages in the three
sectors of the Algerian economy (oil, tradable and non-tradable), so that, ho ; hT and
hnT are equal to 0:32, 0:13 and 0:55 respectively.
13
As in the standard literature of DSGE models, we set the parameter of Calvo price
setting equal to 0:65 . Wage stickiness in the three sectors (oil, 'o, tradable, 'T , and
non-tradable, 'nT , goods sectors) are set at the same level. We assume that this value
is the same across sectors (import, I , and non-tradable sectors, nT ). This means
that, on average, price adjustment occurs every 2:85 quarters. As in Lartey (2008) and
Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006), we set the capital adjustment cost equal to 3 in the three
sectors (oil,  o, tradable,  T , and non-tradable,  nT , sectors). All of these parameters
are listed in Table 1.
Following Dib (2007), the steady-state of gross ination rates, , f are set equal to
1:107, 1:017 respectively. These values are the annual observed averages in the data of
the Algerian and Euro Area economies for the period 1990 2010. The parameter in the
risk-premium terms  is set equal to 0:0015 implying an annual risk premium of 1:35%.
This value is consistent with the average interest rates di¤erential between Algeria and
the Euro Area, and implies a steady-state foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio of 30%, which is
close to that observed average ratio in the data.
Finally, Table 2 reports the results of di¤erent OLS estimations of the exogenous
12Since the Algerian economy exports an insignicant franction of tradable goods, the average ratio
of total tradable production to GDP could be assimilated by the value of the domestic use. This is the
case of many oil exporting countries.
13These values are computed by using ONS (national o¢ ce of statistics) data.
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stochastic processes. All parameters are statistically signicant at the 5% level. Some
of these stochastic processes are highly persistent while others are not.
Table 2 : Calibration of the stochastic parameters
Shocks Autocorrelations Standard deviation
Foreign interest rate Rf 0.9886 Rf 0.1693
Foreign tradable output 
Y fT
0.9676 
Y fT
0.1578
Foreign ination f 0.9549 f 0.1999
Foreign oil output 
Y fo
0.2582 
Y fo
0.0104
Foreign oil price 
pfo
0.2317 
pfo
0.1975
Oil resources shock O 0.9899 O 0.2089
4 Simulations analysis
In this section, we analyze the e¤ect of an increase of one percent in the price of oil
(windfall) and oil resources (boom) on this economy. We attempt to verify if this increase
generates a Dutch disease e¤ect in both resource movement and spending e¤ects and
in which case the phenomenon of de-industrialization is the most important. Thus, we
try to disentangle the source of uctuation, between the windfall and the boom, which
generates a Dutch disease e¤ect. First, we conduct simulations under the hypothesis
of perfect wage and price exibility. Then, we consider the impact of an oil shock
(price and resource) assuming that prices are sticky. Finally, we add the assumption
of wage rigidity. In the two last cases, we analyse the response of some key variables
under alternative monetary policy rules (xed exchange rate rule (ER rule) and ination
targeting rule (IT rule)). The response of our selected variables will be relative to that
of our baseline model. In these cases, this is the gap between both responses (baseline
and sticky price-sticky wage models) that will provide information on the occurrence of
the Dutch disease e¤ect.
4.1 Flexible prices and wages setting
In the case of exible prices, monetary policy plays no role. Simulation results show that
an increase in the international price of oil leads to a decline in the manufacturing sector.
Indeed, Figure 1 shows a decline in all selected variables (production, capital, investment,
wage and hours worked) in the tradable good sector. This decrease is accompanied by
a boom in the oil and non-tradable sectors. Indeed, the impact on other sectors is
quite large. As Figure 1 shows, all variables, capital, investment and wage, for instance,
respond positively to oil price shock. This expansion in the oil sector is the result of
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the decline of manufacturing industry whose wages and capital decline. Hence, labor
demand is much greater in the other sector (resource movement e¤ect).
Figure 1 also shows an appreciation of the real exchange rate after the windall.
This is due to currency inows due to the rise in oil price. This appreciation of exchange
rate seems to contribute partly to the decline of the manufacturing industry through a
decline in price competitiveness of the sector and, therefore, the decline of its exports.
This is similar to the spending e¤ect.
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Figure 1: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil price shock (Baseline model)
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Figure 2: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil resource shock (Baseline model)
After the boom (increase in oil resource), Figure 2 depicts an increase in wages, and
marginal product in the non-manufacturing sector (oil and non-tradable sectors) which
leads to an increase in labor demand and therefore a rise in the production of oil goods
and a decline in the manufacturing production. This second e¤ect is dened as the
resource movement e¤ect. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows an increase in the real
exhange rate due to the rise of oil price. Through the spending e¤ect, the appreciation
of the exchange rate has probably contributed to the de-industrialization of the tradable
good sector.
Through these results, we can see that in both cases, windfall and boom, the economy
undergoes de-industrialization and thus, Dutch disease e¤ects with both spending and
resource movement e¤ects.
To compare the importance of de-industrialization in each case, boom and windfall,
Figure 3 illustrates the impulse response functions of some key variables of the manu-
facturing sector facing an increase of one percent in oil prices and oil resources.
Figure 3 shows that the decline in the manufacturing sector is much larger in the
case of windfall (oil price shock). Indeed, key variables, such as investment, production
and wage decrease more signicantly in the case of a windfall than in the case of a boom.
Therefore, we conclude that, overall, Dutch disease e¤ects are especially the consequence
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of a windfall rather than a boom. Thus, the question we answer is: what is the exchange
rate regime that would avoid the consequences of a windfall and/or of a boom? To do
so, we jointly consider price and wage rigidities.
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Figure 3: Comparison of the e¤ect of a boom and windfall on the tradable sector
4.2 Sticky price model
In the case of sticky prices, the choice of the exchange rate regime plays a central role
in the stabilization of the economy. We rst simulate the impact of an increase in oil
prices (and oil resource) in the case of a xed exchange rate regime (e=1), then we
simulate the impact of an increase in oil prices in the case of a exible exchange rate
regime (e=0) (and oil resource).
4.2.1 Fixed exchange rate
As in the rst case, Figure 4 shows a decline in the manufacturing sector compared to the
other two sectors. Production of tradable goods, accumulation of capital and investment
in this sector all experience a decline, comparatively to the baseline model, due to the
increase in the oil price. In the two other sectors, the situation is di¤erent. This leads
to an instantaneous increase in the production in the oil sector, which generates a large
25
inow of foreign currency. Unlike the baseline model, the windfall does not lead to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. This response can be interpreted as the result
of the intervention of the central bank in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the
exchange rate. Therefore, we conclude that (i) the spending e¤ect has not occurred and
(ii) the decline of the manufacturing sector only results from the resource movement
e¤ect. As Figure 4 shows, the de-industrialization of the economy seems to be the result
of the labor shift from the tradable sector toward the oil and non-tradable sectors.
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Figure 4: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil price shock (sticky price model)
Hours worked respond more after the shock in the oil sector relative to the manufac-
turing sector. This is due to rising wages in the oil sector that create a greater demand
for labor in this sector. As a result, the production of the tradable sector declines.
In the case of a boom, Figure 5 also depicts a decline in the manufacturing sector
due to an increase in oil resources. The oil and non-tradable sectors experience a rise
in production and investment. As in the rst case, the real exchange rate does not
react to the shock. This is due to the fact that the appreciation is absorbed by the
intervention of the monetary authority in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, the
de-industrialization of the manufacturing sector can not be the result of the spending
e¤ect.
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The resource movement e¤ect is the most likely transmission channel. The increase
in production in the oil sector leads to a signicant increase in both wages and hours
worked in this sector compared to the tradable sector.
Overall, we conclude that in the case of sticky prices and the xed exchange rate,
a boom or a windfall in the oil sector generates the Dutch disease e¤ect driven by the
resource movement e¤ect.
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Figure 5: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil resource shock (sticky price model)
4.2.2 Flexible exchange rate
Figure 6 and 7 show that Dutch disease e¤ect does not occur in the case of both windfall
and boom under exible exchange rate. Indeed, compared to the baseline model, the
tradable good sector does not witness a decline, even if the oil and non-tradable sectors
witness a boom following these two exogenous shocks.
These results can be explained by the fact that ination targeting prevents prices
and wages increase in both the oil and non-tradable sectors. Indeed, relatively to the
baseline model, wages in all sectors experienced stability after the oil shock The resource
movement e¤ect is therefore avoided. So, exibility of the exchange rate has not allowed
the occurrence of the Dutch disease under its spending e¤ect. Figure 6 and 7 show that
the exchange rate appreciates in both cases (windfall and boom) but manufacturing
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output does not decline. This can be attributed to the structure of the oil exporting
countriesmanufacturing sector which is characterized by a low level of industrialization
relative to developed countries. In other words, the spending e¤ect is not operational
when the resource movement e¤ect channel is locked. Therefore, exports of tradable
goods are not a¤ected by uctuations of real exchange rate.
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Figure 6: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil price shock (sticky price model)
One of the ndings is that, in the case of an exogenous boom (either an increase in
oil prices or a rise in oil resources), the exible exchange rate regime insulate from Dutch
disease e¤ect to the extent that uctuations of the real exchange rate is insu¢ cient to
trigger the spending e¤ect. This is, maybe, due to the structural characteristic of an oil
exporting economy.
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Figure 7: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil resource shock (sticky price model)
4.3 Sticky prices and wages
In this section we assume that wages are sticky by setting 'j=0.65. In line with the
work of Hausmann and Rigobon (2002) among others, we check the validity of the results
obtained in the general equilibrium framework by comparing the results of a boom and
windfall. As in the previous section, we assume, rstly, that the central bank targets the
nominal exchange rate. Then, we compare the results to those obtained with a exible
exchange rate.
4.3.1 Fixed exchange rate
In the case of a xed nominal exchange rate, Figues 8 and 9 show an increase of both
oil prices and production in the oil sector. This increase is less important than in the
case of the baseline model. Also, manufacturing production does not decline implying
that Dutch disease e¤ects are absent. Figure 9 shows that manufacturing production
increases and then slightly declines. The non-tradable and oil sectors follow a similar
pattern.
Thus, in the case where wages and prices are sticky and where the central bank
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targets the nominal exchange rate, Dutch disease e¤ect does not rise. The main reason
is that the spending e¤ect channel is neutralized by the monetary policy. Fluctuations of
the nominal exchange rate are contained by the monetary authority from the rst quarter
in both cases (boom and windfall). Then, the resource movement e¤ect, consisting in a
shift of labor and capital from the manufacturing sector toward both oil and non-tradable
sectors, is avoided because of sticky wages that does not allows the oil and non-tradable
sectors to become more attractive. Therefore, wages and prices stickness together with
xed exchange rate completly o¤set Dutch disease e¤ects.
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Figure 8: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil price shock (sticky price- wage model)
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Figure 9: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil resource shock (sticky price- wage model)
4.4 Flexible exchange rate
In the last case where the exchange rate regime is exible, Dutch disease e¤ect does not
occur although the spending e¤ect seems to be operational. Relatively to the baseline
model, the manufacturing sector does not decline both in the case of a windfall or a
boom as shown by Figures 10 and 11. Indeed, as in the case where only prices are sticky,
exchange rate exibility is not su¢ cient to allow the realization of the spending e¤ect.
Thus, in both cases (xed exchange rates and exible exchange rates) prices and wages
rigidity insulate the economy from Dutch disease e¤ects in the cases of either a windfall
or a boom.
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Figure 10: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil price shock (sticky price- wage model)
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Figure 11: The e¤ect of a 1% positive oil resource shock (sticky price- wage model)
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5 Welfare e¤ects
In this section, we compare the impact of a windfall and a boom on the welfare under
alternative exchange rate regimes. We compute the welfare using the unconditional
expectation of the utility function. To do this, we use a second-order approximation of
the utility function around the deterministic steady state14.
Formally, the welfare criterion is derived from the following single-period utility func-
tion:
E0
1X
t=0
t U (ct; ht) ; (70)
the second-order approximation result is given by:
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where bars denote steady-state values and hats represent percentage deviations from
the steady-state. The welfare cost is measured by the compensating variation which
allows us to measure the percentage changes in consumption in the deterministic steady
state.
We calculate the welfare e¤ects for the exible price-and-wage model, sticky price
and sticky wage models under alternative exchange rate regimes both in the case of
windfall and boom. Our main ndings are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: Welfare results (in % of the steady state of consumption)
Windfall Boom
Flexible price and wage model 0.0012 0.0212
Exchange rate regime Fixed Flexible Fixed Flexible
Sticky price model 0.015 0.0026 0.0124 0.0030
Sticky price-sticky wage model 0.0563 0.0013 0.0645 0.0070
Table 3 reports, in the exible prices and wages model, that the boom has a far
greater impact on welfare than the windfall. Indeed, welfare gain associated with a
boom is around 0.012% of consumption in a deterministic steady-state, while with a
14For similar method see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)
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boom it is around 0.0212%. This is due to the fact that the windfall, as shown in section
3, leads to a strong e¤ect of Dutch disease in terms of de-industrialization compared to
a boom. Indeed, because of the fall of wages in the tradable sector (more important in
the case of windfall), the households purchasing power is more important in the case of
a boom. In this case, the welfare gain is higher than in the case of windfall.
In the two other models (sticky price model and sticky price and wage model) the
results remain unchanged15 such that, the welfare gain is more important following a
boom rather than a windfall. Indeed, when the exchange rate regime is exible, in the
sticky price model, the welfare is equal to 0.0026% and 0.0030% in the case of windfall
and boom respectively. In the case of sticky prices and wages model, the welfare is equal
to 0.0013% and 0.0070% respectively in the case of a windfall and a boom. As shown by
Table 3, the results are almost similar, in the case of xed exchange rate in both windfall
and boom.
The rest of the results shows that the exible exchange rate regime helps to improve
social welfare. Indeed, after a windall, an increase in oil price generates a more im-
portant welfare gain when the exchange regime is xed. Table 3 reports that, for the
sticky price model, the welfare is estimated at 0.015% and 0.0026% of consumption in
a deterministic steady-state, under a xed exchange rate and a exible exchange rate
respectively. As for the sticky price and wage model, the welfare is around 0.0563% and
0.0013% in the cases of a xed exchange rate regime and a exible exchange rate regime
respectively. In the case of a boom, the results show that welfare is lower when the cen-
tral bank targets the CPI ination. In other words, in the case of a xed exchange rate,
a rise in oil resources leads to a greater welfare gain. In the sticky price model, Table 3
reports values up to 0.0124% and 0.0030% in the cases of a xed exchange rate and a
exible exchange rate respectively. Similarly, in the sticky price and sticky wage model,
the welfare gain is equal to 0.0645% and 0.0070% respectively under a xed exchange
rate and a exible exchange rate.
Thus, the exible exchange rate regime improves the social welfare compared to the
xed exchange rate regime both in the case of a windfall and a boom. This result can
be explained by the fact that CPI ination targeting helps consumption smoothing by
stabilizing prices and maintaining the purchasing power unchanged.
15Except in the case of xed exchange rate when prices are sticky.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have built a multisector DSGE model to model the Dutch disease
phenomenon. To do so, the model takes into account the tradable good sector, the oil
sector and the non-tradable good sector. The tradable good and oil sectors operate un-
der perfect competition and the non-tradable goods sector operates under monopolistic
competition. We have, thus, attempted to compare the response of the selected variables
in the case of a windfall (increase in the oil price) and boom (increase in oil resources)
and how monetary policy should be conducted to insulate the economy from the impacts
of these shocks.
The main nding shows that the Dutch disease under both spending and resource
movement e¤ects seems to be realized in the following cases: exible prices and wages
both in the case of a windfall and in the case of a boom; exible wages and sticky prices
only in the case of xed exchange rate. In others cases, simulations have shown that
the Dutch disease could be avoided if: prices are sticky and wages are exibles when the
exchange rate is exible; prices and wages are sticky whatever the objective of the central
bank, in both cases: windfall and boom. Also, we compared the source of uctuation
that leads to a Dutch disease and we concluded that the windfall leads to a strong e¤ect
of Dutch disease in term of de-industrialization compared to a boom. The choice of
exible exchange rate regime also helps to improve the social welfare.
Finally, it appears that the exible exchange rate seems to be the best way to avoid
the Dutch disease both in the cases of a windfall and a boom but also to improve a social
welfare. In other word, it is preferable for a central bank, in an oil exporting economy,
to adopt ination targeting regime to prevent the impact of oil shocks.
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Table 5: Recent literature of the Dutch disease
Sectors Main assumptions Main results
Sosunov and
Zamulin (2007)
Non-tradable good
sector
- Endogenous rate of
time preference;
-Sticky price of non-
tradable goods;
- Russian economy;
- Increase in
commodity prices.
- The use of international
reserve management as a
tool to stabilize the
economy only if a true
fiscal stabilization fund is
not available;
- the monetary authority
should respond primarily
to inflation and then to the
real exchange rate.
Lartey (2008) - Tradable sector;
- Non-tradable
sector.
- Incomplete Financial
market;
- Sticky price of non-
tradable goods;
- Alternative monetary
policy rules;
- Increase in capital
inflow.
- Dutch disease effects
when monetary authority
target the nominal
exchange rate;
- Welfare result reveal that
a generalized Taylor rule
outperforms a fixed
nominal exchange rate
regime.
Batt et al (2008) - Monetary union
DSGE model;
- Tradable sector;
- Non-tradable
sector.
- Complete financial
market;
- Three monetary
Policy rules;
- Negeria economy;
- Increase in oïl price
and non-oïl price
(agricultural price).
- Sticly price and
wage.
- The economy is affected
by a Dutch diseas
following the shocks;
- Flexible exchange rate
regime with exogenous
money supply allow to
avoid the Dutch disease in
the absence of a
stabilization fund;
Acosta et al
(2009)
- Tradable sector;
- Non-tradable
sector.
- El Salvador
economy;
- Bayesian estimation;
- Rise of level of
Remittances.
- VAR analysis.
- Decline of labor supply;
- Increase in consumption
demand;
- Higher non-tradable
prices and appreciation of
real exchange rate.
- The same results with a
VAR’s impulse responses.
Lama and
Medina (2010)
- Commodity
sector
-Learning-by-doing
externality in tradable
sector;
- nominal rigidities;
- Learning against an
appreciated exchange rate
can prevent an inefficient
loss of tradable output but
at the cost of generating a
misallocation of resource
in other sectors;
- Welfare is a decreasing
function of exchange rate
intervention.
